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When Joseph R. Biden won the US Presidential election on 3 November 2020, the
dawn of a new era seemed at our doorstep. 100 days after his inauguration, this post
examines whether this impression has turned out to be justified from an international
law perspective after his first 100 days. Has Biden lived up to the promises he made
during his campaign for the fields of international security, human rights, international
trade and climate change?
International Security
President Biden stated at the Munich Security Conference in February that the
US commitment to NATO was “unshakeable” and that the partnership between
Europe and the US constituted “the cornerstone of all we hope to accomplish in
the 21st century”. He nevertheless demanded greater burden-sharing regarding
defense spending by the Europeans, mirroring earlier demands made by the Trump
administration. The Biden administration also announced a plan to spend even more
on defense than President Trump.
Additionally, the new administration developed a plan to restore the 2015 Iran
nuclear deal, which Donald Trump had abandoned in May 2018. Careful advances
have already been made.
President Biden announced at the same time that all US troops would leave
Afghanistan by 11 September 2021. The removal of the remaining 3000 American
troops coincides with the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 which marked
the starting point of America’s longest “war” in recent history. The US maintained it
would remain engaged in Afghanistan, albeit focusing its efforts on non-military aid.
In stark contrast to his predecessor, the Biden administration coordinated this step
with NATO partners and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani before his announcement.
These developments give hope that Joe Biden might be much more committed to
multilateralism in the field of international security than his predecessor. 
Human Rights
In a New York Times interview during his campaign, Biden announced that he would
make human rights the cornerstone of US foreign policy.
With regard to the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), the Trump administration
had announced it would leave the Council in June 2018, accusing it of supporting
human rights-abusing States and an anti-Israel bias (see here why these reasons
were not given in good faith). On 8 February 2021, the Biden administration said
the US would engage with the Council “immediately and rigorously” again. For
now, the US can only act as observer, but the new US permanent representative
to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, said the US would run as a candidate in
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October. Interestingly enough, the new administration upholds the substantive
critique of the Trump administration: the US announced it would “push back on
UN human rights violators who want to be legitimized” in the Council and that the
HRC should issue “fewer resolutions against Israel”. How these intentions will be
put in practice, remains unclear. One way would be to press for competitive slates
when new members are elected as usually the regional groups only put forward
the same amount of candidates as seats to be filled. This puts the idea that the
composition of the Council should reflect the human rights record of its members
(UNGA resolution 60/251) ad absurdum. Only where there are more candidates
than seats can this criterion be respected – as the recent rejection of Saudi Arabia’s
candidacy for the Council shows. With regard to Israel, the easiest way would be for
the US to take a more differentiated approach to the issue in the Security Council –
making the continued engagement of the matter in the HRC dispensable, but that
seems an unrealistic scenario. At least, the new Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken,
acknowledged that “walking away won’t fix [the Council]” and that the departure had
“created a vacuum of US leadership”.
Only a few days later, on 12 February 2021, the US also announced it would review
its efforts to close the Guantanamo prison in Cuba. Until today, the prison remains
the Bush administration’s most toxic heritage: terrorism suspects are indefinitely
detained as wartime captives, they are denied a fair trial and given inhumane
treatment. In the view of past Republican administrations, the Guantánamo
detainees are neither entitled to constitutional protection (as they were located
outside US territory), nor to protection under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights or the Geneva conventions (as the US considered them “unlawful
combatants” (see here and here).
Today, Guantanamo holds 40 detainees. While President Barack Obama had
promised to close Guantánamo during his campaign, he never made good on this
promise. President Trump never intended to close Guantanamo, but announced
instead to further “load it up with some bad dudes”. While many questions of the
Biden’s announcement remain open, at least the new administration announced
it did “not intend to bring new detainees to the facility.” So far, however, the new
administration seems shy to commit to bringing the remaining detainees to prisons
and courts on American soil – a step that would be necessary if the US wants to be
serious about making human rights the cornerstone of its politics. With regard to this
issue, Biden might be heading towards the exact same failings as President Obama.
International Trade
For many international lawyers (see here and here) the US’ continued blockage
of the appointment of new members to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Appellate Body (AB) has been a particular worry. This has brought the appellate
process, and the entire WTO, close to collapse. The WTO does currently not offer its
members access to a binding, two-tier, independent and impartial resolution of trade
disputes any longer, given that the AB does not reach the quorum of three members
necessary to hear appeals since the Trump administration blocked the appointment
of new nominees in December 2019. Given that “[v]acancies shall be filled as they
arise” (Art. 17.2 Dispute Settlement Understanding), the members of the WTO are
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in breach of their own rules. While the US has recently given up its opposition to the
appointment of Nigeria’s Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as the new director general of the
WTO, and while the new US Trade Representative (USTR), Katherine Tai, said in
her confirmation hearing she would work in a “practical and constructive” manner
with the WTO (see here, p. 2), the Biden administration has not so far lifted its veto
on the appointment of new AB members. Quite to the contrary, Ms. Tai also stated
that “over the years, the appellate body has overstepped its authority and erred in
interpreting WTO agreements in a number of cases” (see here, p. 6). It is thus likely
that the US will only give up its opposition to new appointments of the AB if the WTO
partners make concessions to reform that body.
With regard to bilateral trade relations, after a heated exchange between US Foreign
Secretary, Antony Blinken, and China’s most senior foreign policy official, Yang
Jiechi, one has to assume US-China trade relations remain tense. Biden’s priority
now rather seems to be creating a greater common cause with allies against China,
especially on technology and economics. The development of US-EU economic
relations must be assessed differently: Biden vowed to end Trump’s “artificial trade
war” with the EU. In the meantime, both sides announced they would suspend tariffs
connected to the longstanding Airbus-Boeing dispute for the next four months.
Climate Change
On the first day of his presidency, Joe Biden announced that the US would be
rejoining the Paris Agreement. The decision took effect on 19 February 2021.
At a virtual climate summit on 22 & 23 April with 40 world leaders – dramatically
convened on Earth Day with an appearance from Pope Francis – President Biden
pledged to cut US greenhouse gas emission in half by 2030 as compared to 2005,
thereby nearly doubling the previous commitment set by President Obama in
2015. This is a necessary step if the US wants to stand any chance of meeting
its mission of net zero emissions by 2050, as was repeatedly promised by Biden
during his campaign. While some other State leaders pledged similarly ambitious
goals (e.g. Canada and Japan), some of the biggest emitters did not make any
new commitments, notably Chinaand India. Whether the US can live up to its self-
announced goal of becoming the world leader in the fight against climate change
will depend on whether, and when, the US can convince States like China and India
to join in the efforts. China currently emits nearly twice the amount of Co2 as the
US. By December – at the COP26 UN climate change conference in Glasgow – we
may know whether Biden is on track towards its newly announced goals, and able to
leverage progress to convince other states to follow-suit. And what if Biden’s slogan
“More green energy means more green jobs” does not hold up? Mr. Biden has just
experienced that a path to re-election is only possible via the rust belt – a region
highly dependent on very “un-green” jobs. Republicans at home have immediately
critiqued the goals as raising energy prices and destroying jobs.
Conclusion
If we put these developments in the first 100 days in the context of broader theories
of international relations, we see a mixture of neo-isolationism / restraint (e.g. the
withdrawal of the troops from Afghanistan), liberal internationalism (e.g. rejoining
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the Paris Climate Agreement or the Human Rights Council) mixed in with some
elements of primacy (e.g. with the US insisting on its own ideas about the WTO
AB). While the Trump administration was largely dominated by neo-isolationism in
its foreign policy, the new Biden government is clearly a much stronger believer in
liberal internationalism, much to the joy of most other States.
However, there are also areas where President Biden has not changed course.
International trade within the WTO has been mentioned. Another example is that
of the International Criminal Court (ICC). While he lifted sanctions on the ICC’s top
prosecutor on 2 April 2021, Secretary of State Blinken reaffirmed the US’ previous
critique of the ICC in general and specifically on their engagement with Iraq and
Palestine. The Biden administration will not join the Rome Statute, leaving only the
modest hope that the US will at least display less open hostility vis-à-vis the court.
Second, while many States are working towards human rights obligations of
businesses (either in the new treaty initiativeat the Human Rights Council or via
national legislation such as the loi de vigilance in France or the Lieferkettengesetz in
Germany), the US remain purposefully absent from any business and human rights
debate. Mr. Biden has remained silent on the issue.
Finally, with a view to (im)migration, while Joe Bide has in the first 100 days
proposed raising the refugee ceiling, quadrupling President Trump’s historically low
cap, it is equally true that due to a delay in signing a presidential decree on refugee
admissions, President Biden is on track to accept the fewest number of refugees this
year of any modern president – including Donald Trump.
What can we make of this analysis? Maybe it is best to remember Amanda
Gorman’s words, the 22-year-old poet who impressed millions of viewers with her
inauguration poem:
“[i]f we’re to live up to our own time, then victory won’t lie in the blade, but in
all the bridges we’ve made. That is the promise to glade, the hill we climb, if
only we dare.”
Joe Biden has certainly taken these words to heart in his first 100 days. However,
it is easy to make promises and symbolic gestures in the first weeks of a new
Presidency. The harder work lies still ahead of the President, in the next four or eight
years to come.
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